
/> 1 Introduction
Ad hoc networks are a new paradigm of wireless mobile hosts (which we call nodes). Year of the ad hoc network, there is no fixed infrastructure such as base stations and mobile switching centers. mobile nodes within radio range communicate directly with each other through wireless connections, while those that are far away to rely on other nodes relayed messages from routers. node mobility in ad hoc network causes frequent changes in the network. Tactical military operations are still the main
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To ad hoc networks today. For example, the military unit (eg soldiers, tanks or aircraft) which are equipped with wireless communication devices may establish an ad hoc network transition from the battlefield. Ad hoc networks can also be used in an emergency, police and rescue missions. As an ad hoc network can be relatively inexpensive to implement as soon as it becomes attractive for commercial uses, such as sensor networks or virtual classrooms.
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1st One of the goals of security
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Security is an important issue for ad hoc networks, especially in security-sensitive applications. In order to protect the ad hoc network, consider the following attributes: availability, confidentiality, integrity, authentication and non-repudiation.
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Availability ensures maritime security of network services despite denial of service charge. Denial of service attack could be launched at every level of the ad hoc network. Physical and medium access control layers, may be employed as anti-jamming communication interfere with the physical channel. On the network level, the fight could disrupt the routing protocol and disconnect the network. At higher layers, can lower high against the services. This service aims to senior executives, security framework, an important service.
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Confidentiality ensures that certain information is never disclosed to unauthorized persons. transmission of sensitive data, such as strategic or tactical military demands confidentiality. Loss of this information the enemy could have devastating consequences. Routing information must also remain confidential, in some cases, that information can be useful for enemies to find and locate their targets on the battlefield.
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ensure the integrity of the message that the transition has never been broken. The message could be corrupted due to benign failures, such as radio propagation impairment, or through the network from malicious attacks.
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Authentication allows the node to the identity of peer nodes are communicating with. Without authentication, anti-node may be make-believe, therefore, to obtain unauthorized access to resources and sensitive information and interfering with the operation of other components.
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Finally, non-repudiation of origin shall ensure that the message does not deny the message. Non-repudiation is useful for the detection and isolation of the risk of knots. If a node receives a message to node B, non-repudiation allows accuse B using this message and to convince other nodes that B is compromised.
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There are security objectives (eg, license), which is important for some applications, but these issues will continue in this document.
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1st 2 challenges
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The most important aspects of ad hoc networks are both challenges and opportunities for achieving these safety objectives.
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First, the use of wireless links makes it an ad hoc network susceptible to link attacks from passive eavesdropping agency, the message playback, and distorted the message. Eavesdropping give access to secret information against breaches of confidentiality. Active attacks may be illegal to delete messages, inject erroneous messages, edit messages, and to represent the node, therefore, violates the availability, integrity, authentication and non-repudiation.
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Second, nodes, roaming in hostile environments (such as a battlefield) with relatively poor physical protection, is not negligible probability of risk. Therefore, we must consider not only the malicious attacks from outside the network, but also consider the threat of attacks from inside the network nodes. Therefore, in order to achieve high survivability, ad hoc networks have been divided into different architectures without a central unit. Any central element of our security solution could lead to significant vulnerability, ie, either of this centralized entity is compromised, then the whole system is subverted.
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Thirdly, the ad hoc network is dynamic due to frequent changes in its topology and its membership (eg, nodes frequently enter and exit the network). Trust between nodes also changes, for example, when some nodes are detected in jeopardy. Unlike other mobile wireless networks such as mobile IP [21, 48, 34] ad-hoc network nodes can be dynamically register with the administrative areas. Any security solution with the static configuration is not sufficient. It is hoped that our security mechanisms-the-spot fly to adapt to these changes.
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Finally, an ad hoc network may consist of hundreds or even thousands of nodes. security mechanisms must be scalable to deal with this great network.
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1st 3 routing protocols and the risks
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Routing protocols for ad hoc networks is still an active research. There is no single standard routing protocol. Thus, our aim is to capture common security threats and to issue guidelines to ensure that the routing protocols. In most routing protocols, routers exchange network to create routes between nodes. This information may change target to be brought against a malicious network. There are two sources of threats to routing protocols. The first comes from external attackers. Injecting erroneous routing information, replaying old routing information, or distorting routing information, an attacker could successfully partition a network or introduce excessive network traffic load caused by the retransmission and inefficient routing.
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Second, and even the most serious type of threat from the endangered nodes, which can advertise incorrect routing information to other nodes. Detection of such incorrect information is difficult: just need to route information must be signed by each node does not work, because compromised nodes can generate valid signatures using their private keys.
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Protection of the first type of threats that nodes can protect routing information in the same way I protect the data traffic E. Through the use of cryptographic systems, such as a digital signature. However, this protection is not effective against attacks compromised servers. What is worse, because we say we can not overlook the possibility of an ad hoc network nodes at risk. Identification of the nodes is also difficult to distort routing information in its ad-hoc network topology that changes dynamically: when a piece of route information is found invalid, the information could compromise a node, or would have become invalid due to topology changes. It is difficult to distinguish between the two cases.
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On the other hand, we can use certain features of ad hoc networks to achieve secure routing. Please note that the routing protocols for ad hoc networks have to deal with outdated information on the route to accommodate dynamically changing topology. False routing information generated nodes could be compromised in any way be regarded as outdated information. As long as there are enough correct nodes, the routing protocol should find paths that go around the tips of their risk. Ability to routing protocols is usually based on the redundancy – can be multiple disjoint, routes between nodes – the ad hoc networks.
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2nd Key Management Service
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We use encryption, such as digital signatures to protect both routing information and data. Such programs usually require a Key Management Service. We are using a public key infrastructure, because of its superiority achieved by dividing the keys and the identity and repudiation. An efficient public key systems are used to further communication after the nodes to authenticate each other and create a shared secret session key. If the public key infrastructure, each node has a public / private key pair. The public key can be distributed by other nodes, while private keys will be kept confidential to individual nodes. It is entrusted to a person named “certification (CA) [11, 47 and 26], the top executives. CA is a public / private key pair, a public key known to each node, and certificates of public keys for tying knots. Be trusted to reflect the online connections, because connections may change over time: the public key must be revoked if the owner node is no longer credible, or are outside the network node can update its key pair periodically to reduce opportunities for a successful brute force attack on his private key. It is difficult to detect using one of the top leaders of the CA ad hoc networks. CA, who are responsible for the security of the whole network vulnerable point if the network is available in CA, can not enter into the course of public keys or other items to create a safe interaction with others. If the CA is compromised and leaks its private key to fight, the enemy will then write a certificate using the private key to impersonate any node or revoked.
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The standard approach to improve the availability of the service replication. But a naive replication of the CA makes the service vulnerable patients in each replication, which hold the private key of the service, may lead to collapse of the whole system. To solve this problem is to share the confidence of a set of nodes, allowing nodes to share the responsibility of senior managers.
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3rd Push! Photo: Photo Sharing informal ad hoc networks
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Such as mobile camera phones become ubiquitous in practice, became a photo. Camera phone pictures are usually taken in view of sharing. Meanwhile, publicly sharing photos has become increasingly popular sites like Flickr. Push! The picture is a picture of the moving image-sharing applications can be made public and accessible to all nearby. The application will automatically search for nearby devices to find the appropriate photos and interesting photographs. Push! This picture shows how you can share your digital photos as easy as a picture card.
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Shoot!
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Disclosed!
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Explore!
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Enjoy!
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3rd 1 PUSH! The prototype PHOTO
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The current prototype of the Push! Photographic images of to enable the public domain, and users can browse the photo collection, and others nearby. If the equipment is close together, which will automatically find each other’s public photo collections
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Photos relevant to themselves. These photos are displayed as multi-image, which is extended as new images are found. To browse the images shown in particular cases, a photo, you can click on the photo slideshow. Then the application downloads all images in the vicinity of the equipment at that event. Thus, if a user posts an interesting slide show, you can easily find other pictures at that time. To decide
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If two photos are of the same events, information on who else was around and the time of shooting is used. Application implements a search service to find other devices, if they have Wi-Fi range. So the question is always aware of who else (with Push! Photo) is about a specific time. Since the photo was taken, resulting in an image is encoded with information about the time and the identity of the photographer. The current prototype is an application running
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Pocket PC WiFi SD cards, and non-telecamere
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3rd 2 work-related
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Push previous works! Music [2 files] music has been replaced by the so-called agents in the media, the self-managed copy of the ad hoc wireless network devices. Agents try to find their average />
Make it a potential audience of people meet and how the song is automatically copied to enter the play list. In this way users discover new music and listen passively. Other projects have studied photo-sharing cabinet. Davis et al. mm2 in using the concept of co-existence of simplifying the decision to share [1]. Images are then uploaded automatically to central web server, if the beneficiary can be used for photo sharing. Kohno Rekimoto, and instead use the time stamp and the GPS information to determine whether or not the event itself images [4]. It allows users to easily move photos to function as a group stand to discuss topics. The system allows users to drag and drop files from your other devices. By contrast, Push! Photo aims to examine how the share of mobile phones can be simplified, allowing for seamless sharing and use of context and automatically tagging images to find interesting and relevant
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4 CONCLUSIONS
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In this article, we analyze the security threats an ad hoc network faces, and the safety objectives are achieved. First of all, security-sensitive applications of ad hoc networks require high security, on the other hand, ad hoc networks are inherently vulnerable to security. Therefore, security mechanisms are indispensable for ad hoc networks. Idiosyncrasy of ad hoc networks pose challenges and opportunities in these mechanisms. This book focuses on how to create a safe route, and how senior executives are Ad hoc networking. These two aspects are essential to achieve our security objectives. In addition to standard security mechanisms, we use an ad hoc network redundancy and the use of different encoding lines to tolerate both benign and Byzantine failures. To create a highly available and highly secure key management service is proposed to use threshold cryptography to distribute trust set of servers. In addition, our senior managers in active service is part of a refreshing change to adapt to network security and scalable way. Finally, relaxing the requirement of continuity of the servers, our service is based on the assumptions in sync. This can lead to vulnerability. Service has implemented a prototype of the senior managers to demonstrate the feasibility. Document the first step in our research to analyze security threats, to include safety requirements for ad hoc networks, and existing techniques to identify and provide new mechanisms to ensure that the ad-hoc networks. Much work is still needed to go their security mechanisms
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ad-hoc network and study the impact of security mechanisms the network’s performance.
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5 Acknowledgements
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I would like to thank my friends for their valuable contribution to this work. I am also grateful to my family and anonymous reviewers for their comments and suggestions, which helped to improve the quality of the paper.
I am grateful to the Almighty bless him for me.
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